‘The Messaging Effect’: Eliciting Credible Historical Evidence from Victims of Mass Crimes by MOHAN, Mahdev
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2008 Asian Business & Rule of Law initiative School of Law
11-2012
‘The Messaging Effect’: Eliciting Credible Historical
Evidence from Victims of Mass Crimes
Mahdev MOHAN
Singapore Management University, mahdevm@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_aprl
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Human Rights Law Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It
has been accepted for inclusion in 2008 Asian Business & Rule of Law initiative by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
MOHAN, Mahdev. ‘The Messaging Effect’: Eliciting Credible Historical Evidence from Victims of Mass Crimes. (2012). 2008 Asian










Mahdev Mohan, “„The Messaging Effect‟: Eliciting Credible Historical Evidence from Vic-
tims of Mass Crimes”, in Morten Bergsmo and CHEAH Wui Ling (editors), Old Evidence 
and Core International Crimes, FICHL Publication Series No. 16 (2012), Torkel Opsahl 
Academic EPublisher, Beijing, ISBN 978-82-93081-60-9. First published on 19 November 
2012. 
This publication and other TOAEP publications may be openly accessed and downloaded 
through the website www.fichl.org. This site uses Persistent URLs (PURL) for all publica-
tions it makes available. The URLs of these publications will not be changed. Printed copies 
may be ordered through online distributors such as www.amazon.co.uk. 
© Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2012. All rights are reserved. 
 
 FICHL Publication Series No. 16 (2012) – page 167 
10 
______ 
‘The Messaging Effect’:  
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The 1971 ‘war of independence’ was an armed conflict that pit then East 
Pakistan and India against then West Pakistan. It led to the secession of 
East Pakistan and the formation and recognition of the independent State 
of Bangladesh. The conflict claimed countless lives,1 and displaced 10 
million people.2 The atrocities committed in 1971 have been described as 
“selective genocide” by the U.S. embassy in Dhaka in a cable in March 
1971, revealed in declassified documents in 2002.3  
The current administration led by the Bangladesh Awami League in 
Bangladesh recently established an International Crimes Tribunal (‘ICT-
BD’) within its domestic court structure to try those accused of crimes 
against humanity, genocide, and war crimes during that tragic period in 
the country’s history. The ICT-BD’s first trial commenced on 20 Novem-
ber 2011, almost four decades after the conflict took place. The ICT-BD’s 
affiliates opine that justice delayed is better than having it denied. The 
                                                   
* 
Mahdev Mohan, Assistant Professor of Law at the Singapore Management Universi-
ty School of Law (‘SMU’), Director, SMU Asian Peace-building and Rule of Law 
Programme (‘APRL’). I am grateful for the invaluable research assistance of Ms. 
Geetanjali Mukherjee, Research Fellow at SMU’s APRL. 
1
  The Rahman Commission estimates 26,000 died in the conflict (available at 
http://www.bangla2000.com/bangladesh/Independence-War/Report-Hamoodur-Rahm 
an/default.shtm, last accessed on 19 October 2012), while others such as Bina 
D’Costa has estimated that the number is closer to three million; see Bina D’Costa, 
“Frozen in time? War crimes, justice and political forgiveness”, in Nation building, 
gender and war crimes in South Asia, Routledge, London, 2011.  
2
  D’Costa, 2011, p. 145, supra note 1.  
3
  U.S. Consulate in Dacca, “U.S. Department of State Telegram on ‘Selective geno-
cide’”, 27 March 1971, see available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/ 
NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB1.pdf, last accessed on 19 October 2012. 
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ICT-BD prosecutor Advocate Zead-Al-Malum stated that, “[t]he interna-
tional community had never any reason to be concerned about the stand-
ard of Bangladesh’s legal system […] my team members and I are com-
mitted to do our best to ensure justice, that is not for the victims only, but 
also for the accused”.4 
 The trials have been criticised as being politically charged, and as 
facing significant challenges in terms of their legitimacy, due process and 
procedural fairness.5 U.S.-based Human Rights Watch stated in a letter to 
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina that without significant amendments to the 
International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973 (‘1973 Act’), the judicial pro-
cess would fail to meet international standards of fair trial6. In March 
2011, U.S. Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes Issues Stephen J. Rapp 
drafted a series of recommendations suggesting amendments to the rules 
of the ICT-BD, which may help to ensure that the ICT-BD’s proceedings 
are fair and transparent.7 
Ambassador Rapp recommended that provisions enshrining the 
right to appeal against interlocutory orders be incorporated, along with 
provisions adopting the International Criminal Court’s “elements of 
crime”8, an interpretive tool which assists the ICC in the interpretation 
                                                   
4
  Zead-al-Malum, Meeting on Bangladesh: Exchange of Views on War Crimes Trials 
and on Accountability Issues, The Delegation for Relations for the Countries of South 
Asia, 31 January 2012, European Parliament, Brussels, available at http://icsforum. 
org/blog/icsf/text-of-speech-before-the-eu-parliaments-delegation-by-ict-prosecutor/, 
last accessed on 19 October 2012. 
5
  John Cammegh, a British lawyer advising the defense, argues that the trials “mak[e] a 
mockery” of the principle of accountability against impunity, due to its inadequate 
protections / safeguards for the defense of the accused. See further John Cammegh, 
“In Bangladesh: Reconciliation or Revenge?”, New York Times, 17 November 2011.  
6
  Human Rights Watch, “Letter to Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Re: International 
Crimes (Tribunals) Act”, available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/07/08/letter-
prime-minister-sheikh-hasina-re-international-crimes-tribunals-act, last accessed on 
19 October 2012. 
7
  “Recommendations made by Stephen J Rapp, US Ambassador at Large, War Crimes 
Issues & the extent of their implementations by the International Crimes Tribunal and 




ed 19 October 2012. 
8
  U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000) 
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and application of the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes – all crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICT-BD as well.9 He 
also suggested that the accused should be ensured the rights under Part III 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), as well 
as to include provisions detailing the detention of the accused similar to 
that used by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (‘ICTR’). He 
further recommended the inclusion of rules on the presumption of inno-
cence and placing the burden of proof on the prosecution. He additionally 
suggested incorporating rules on witness protection and granting visas to 
foreign counsel whose advice has been sought.10 
10.2. Message as Medium in Bangladesh? 
With justice processes that seek accountability for core international 
crimes, it is not enough to merely denounce alleged perpetrators, as the 
credibility and legitimacy of such processes are locally perceived and as-
sessed – that is by the very local constituents they are meant to vindicate 
and serve.11 As Rama Mani observes, “[i]f ideas and institutions about as 
fundamental and personal a value as justice are imposed from the outside 
without an internal resonance, they may flounder, notwithstanding their 
assertions of universality”.12 
Ambassador Rapp has observed,  
[…] these trials […] are of great importance to the victims of 
the 1971 war of independence from Pakistan. What happens 
in Bangladesh today will send a strong message that it is 
possible for a national system to bring those responsible for 
grave human rights abuses to justice (emphasis added).
13
  
Ambassador Rapp appears to view the trial as, among other things, 
an expressivist exercise for victims of the war: a process that is designed 
                                                   
9
  See Rapp’s Recommendations in supra note 7.  
10
  Ibid. 
11
  Mark Drumbl, “Rights, Culture and Crime: The Role of Rule of Law for the 
Women of Afghanistan”, in Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 2004, vol. 
42, p. 349. 
12
  Rama Mani, Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War, Blackwell 
Publishers, 2002, p. 49. 
13
 “Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal: The judges, at the first opportunity, must 
define what the term ‘crimes against humanity’ means”, Voice of America, 6 Decem-
ber 2011. 
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to tell a story and, through trial, verdict and punishment, affirm the value 
of law, strengthen social solidarity and incubate a moral consensus 
among victims.14 His view accords with the UN Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-Moon’s definition of ‘legacy’ as:  
[…] a court’s lasting impact on bolstering the rule of law in 
a particular society, including by conducting effective trials 




Put differently, expressivism is less concerned with whether the 
law deters or punishes, than it is with the message victims get from the 
law. Diane Marie Aman reminds us, however, that for the law to have 
expressive value, the “message understood, rather than the message 
intended, is critical”.16 To send the right message, justice processes and 
their affiliates must be attentive to their primary constituents – their vic-
tims. This attentiveness can pave the way for justice and reconciliation, 
which are maximised when undertaken in a manner that resonates in local 
cultures and communities, the environs in which law matters most and in 
which the actual abuses take place.17 
Ambassador Rapp’s recommendations are consistent with interna-
tional law and practice and should be applauded. But further research 
should be undertaken to consider contemporary Bangladeshi sentiments 
about the ICT-BD and Rapp’s recommendations. In order to have reso-
nance and to be properly understood and received, any proposed legal re-
forms to the ICT-BD must be context-sensitive, and not simply adopt a 
one-size-fits-all approach to transitional justice.18 As Ambassador Rapp 
                                                   
14
 Mark Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, New York, 2007, p. 17.
 
15
 “Guidance Note of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Approach to Transi-
tional Justice” was issued on 10 March 2010 by the U.N. Secretary-General. 
16
  Diane Marie Aman, “Message As Medium in Sierra Leone”, in International 
Law Students Association (hereinafter ‘ILSA’) Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, 2001, vol. 7, p. 238. 
17
  See generally, Drumbl, 2004, see supra note 11; Elizabeth S. Anderson and Richard 
H. Pildes, “Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement”, in University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, 2000, vol. 1503, p. 148; and Dan M. Kahan, “The Secret 
Ambition of Deterrence”, in Harvard Law Review, 1999, vol. 113, no. 2. 
18
  Increasingly, research is being undertaken to explore innovative and contextual ap-
proaches to transitional justice, including research and writing by this author in col-
laboration with others.  
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himself concedes, it is crucial to “keep in mind that different countries 
have different procedures and different courts have had different proce-
dures”.19 After all, victims of massacres that transpired nearly four dec-
ades ago often have an astute appreciation of the historical and political 
baggage that hinders efforts to secure accountability. Survivors of the lib-
eration war are no different. 
Drawing on lessons the author has learnt from litigation at the Ex-
traordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (‘ECCC’)20, including 
gathering victim evidence in relation to its putative Cases 003 and 004, 
this chapter considers: (a) the inherent challenges of eliciting non-
contemporaneous or ‘old’ evidence from victims/witnesses; (b) how to 
gather and verify old evidence from victims/witnesses; and (c) what 
courts should take into account when applying for and enforcing protec-
tive measures for them.  
These considerations are critically important to the fair administra-
tion of justice by the ICT-BD and the sober reality that the tribunal is, and 
should be, only one component of transitional justice processes in Bang-
ladesh. Such processes ought to respond to the country’s context while 
anchored in international norms and standards to address the impact of 
large-scale past abuses in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and 
achieve reconciliation, which may include non-judicial mechanisms. 
                                                   
19
  Stephen J. Rapp, Ambassador-at-Large, War Crimes Issues, Press Conference, 13 
January 2011, p. 20. 
20
  The ECCC is a hybrid tribunal established on 6 June 2003 by a bilateral agreement 
between the U.N. and the Cambodian government as an “Extraordinary Chambers 
within the existing court structure of Cambodia for the prosecution of crimes commit-
ted during the period of Democratic Kampuchea”; albeit with international assistance. 
See “Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambo-
dia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during 
the Period of Democratic Kampuchea”, U.N.-Cambodia, 6 June 2003, available at 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-documents/Agreement_between_UN_ 
and_RGC.pdf, last accessed on 19 October 2012. The KRT was recognized by the 
Cambodian legislature on 27 October 2004 when it ratified and implemented the U.N. 
“Agreement through the adoption of enabling legislation named the Law on the Rati-
fication of the Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of 
Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed 
during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea and Law on Amendments to the Law on 
the ECCCC for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democrat-
ic Kampuchea”, U.N. Cambodia, 5 October 2004. 
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10.3. The ‘War of Independence’, Politics and Elusive Justice 
The seeds of a conflict as complex as the war of independence did not 
begin with the armed attacks of 1971, but can be traced to deep-seated 
grievances, politicking and unrest. The declaration by Muhammad Ali 
Jinnah as early as 1948 of Urdu as the official language of Pakistan as a 
whole was deeply resented by East Pakistanis, and led to an uprising in 
1952, and the deaths of several demonstrators. Conflict mounted with 
economic and political grievances in East Pakistan. Although East Paki-
stan’s population was larger, West Pakistan received the lion’s share of 
fiscal support, and opportunities in government. 
Additionally, in 1970, a cyclone devastated large parts of East Paki-
stan, with a reported death toll between 300,000 and 500,000.21 Pakistani 
President General Yahya Khan mismanaged the relief efforts and tried to 
suppress the magnitude of loss, leading to protests against the regime in 
Dhaka. In the same year, the Awami League led by Mujibur Rahman 
(‘Mujib’) achieved a landslide victory in East Pakistan, obtaining an over-
all majority of parliamentary seats in Pakistan. However, Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto was unwilling to allow Mujib become the Prime Minister, and 
proposed a joint-P.M. solution, which was not well received by the East 
Pakistanis. Subsequently Bhutto and Yahya Khan travelled to Dhaka to 
seek a solution. 
However, unrest was brewing and West Pakistan secretly flew a 
number of soldiers to East Pakistan. On 25 March 1971, the Pakistani ar-
my launched Operation Searchlight, an attempt to quash the movement 
for liberation by the then East Pakistanis. The army began to gun down 
students, intelligentsia and Bengali members of the military, especially 
targeting the Hindu areas. Mujib was arrested, but not before he reported-
ly declared the emergence of the State of Bangladesh in the early hours of 
the next morning.  
Over the next nine months of conflict, an estimated three million 
people were killed,22 although the Hamoodur Rahman Commission esti-
                                                   
21
  Nicholas D. Kristof, “Cyclone in Bangladesh Tests the Fragile New Democracy”, 
19 May 1991. 
22
  D’Costa, 2011, p. 145, see supra note 1. Although it is difficult to independently 
confirm this figure. 
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mates only 26,000 victims.23 Also, it is estimated that there were about 10 
million refugees crossing the border into India.24 Around 200,000 women 
were raped by West Pakistani soldiers, leading to a generation of ‘war ba-
bies’.25 The international community failed to stop the atrocities, although 
the United Nations condemned the human rights violations. India finally 
intervened, sending arms and soldiers into East Pakistan, and training 
guerrilla fighters, resulting in a war between the two countries. The West 
Pakistani army surrendered on 16 December 1971. General Yahya Khan 
was subsequently ousted, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was declared the Prime 
Minister of Pakistan.  
Prime Minister Bhutto negotiated with India for the return of land 
lost by Pakistan as well as the release of Pakistani POWs. India held 
90,000 POWs, the most since World War II. Pakistan refused to recognise 
the new State of Bangladesh, and thus Bangladesh and India refused to 
settle the issue of POWs. Mujib wanted to try 1,500 of the POWs for al-
leged war crimes,26 although later the number was reduced to 195 accused 
of genocide and other serious crimes, and the other 90,000 POWs were 
given amnesty and returned to Pakistan. On 17 April 1973, the govern-
ment decided to convene war crimes trials, however political factionalism 
within the country and compromises struck with Pakistan led to them be-
ing shelved indefinitely. Mujib and his family were assassinated in 1975 
after the Awami League was removed from power, 27  and Bangladesh 
went through 15 years of martial law, poverty and economic hardship.  
In the aftermath of the war, the new government was unable to 
prosecute alleged war criminals. In 1972, the Bangladesh Collaborators 
(Special Tribunals) Order came into force, to indict those who collaborat-
                                                   
23
  The Hamoodur Rahman Commission was appointed by the President of Pakistan in 
December 1971 to inquire into the circumstances of the surrender of the Pakistani 
forces to India. The Commission examined 213 witnesses and its report was submit-
ted in July 1972. See also Ziauddin Ahmed, “The Case of Bangladesh: Bringing to 
Trial Perpetrators of the 1971 Genocide”, in ed. Contemporary Genocides: Causes, 
Cases, Consequences, Albert Jongman, 1996, pp. 95–115. 
24
  D’Costa, 2011, p. 145, see supra note 1. See also Susan Brownmiller, Against Our 
Will: Men, Women and Rape, Simon and Schuster, 1975. 
25
  D’Costa, 2011, see supra note 1. 
26
  D’Costa, 2011, p. 145, see supra note 1. 
27
  D’Costa, 2011, p. 149, see supra note 1. 
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ed with the Pakistani forces.28 There are conflicting reports on the number 
of arrests and trials conducted by the tribunals;29 however, it is generally 
believed that evidentiary difficulties held up the trials.30 Pressing humani-
tarian and economic concerns also derailed any plans for legal proceed-
ings31.  
The promulgation of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act of 
1973 (‘1973 ICT Act’) was the only concrete legislative step taken to-
wards accountability. 32  In November 1973, however, the government 
granted a general amnesty and released most of the detainees.33 Organisa-
tions that were previously labelled collaborators and banned were permit-
ted to participate in politics, and many of their members were appointed 
to influential positions in government, making the establishment of a tri-
bunal even less probable.34 
The assassination of Mujib and the political events that followed 
forestalled all accountability processes for the next several years. In the 
1990s, powerful civil society advocates, movements and campaigns called 
for erstwhile alleged collaborators to be removed from power and brought 
to justice.35  
10.4. New Parliamentary Resolve and a Push to Prosecute Core 
Crimes with an Old Statute 
The Liberation War Museum, located in Dhaka, Bangladesh, was estab-
lished on 22 March 1996, and it has since been archiving documents and 
testimonies of the war.36 The Museum is located in two buildings, with a 
                                                   
28
  Suzannah Linton, “Completing The Circle: Accountability For The Crimes Of The 
1971 Bangladesh War Of Liberation”, in Criminal Law Forum, 2010, vol. 21, no. 2, 
p. 204. 
29
  Some reports state 11,000 suspects were in custody and 73 tribunals constituted.  
30
  Linton, 2010, p. 205, see supra note 28. 
31
  D’Costa, 2011, p. 151, see supra note 1. 
32
  D’Costa, 2011, p. 150, see supra note 1. 
33
  Linton, 2010, p. 205, see supra note 28. 
34
  D’Costa, 2011, p. 151, see supra note 1. 
35
  D’Costa, 2011, pp. 151–152, see supra note 1. For example, Jahanara Imam’s cam-
paign against Golam Azam and the Ghatok Dalal Nirmul Committee.  
36
 Liberation War Museum, “About Us”, available at http://liberationwarmuseum.org/ 
about-us. It is directed by Mr. Mofidul Haque, also a trustee of the museum. 
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total of six galleries.37 The collection has over 10,000 artefacts, including 
rare photographs, documents and pamphlets. The museum has an outreach 
programme that educates students who visit it.38 Another outreach project 
consists of a large bus mounted with 360 photographs and objects, acting 
as a mobile exhibition, which travels to different parts of the country. 
The process of pursuing justice for the victims of the 1971 atrocities 
moved forward in April 2008, with the War Crimes Fact Finding Com-
mittee releasing a list of 1,597 war criminals involved in the 1971 war.39 
The list included Pakistani Army officers, political collaborators and 
members of the Jamaat-e-Islami, a junior coalition partner in the previous 
government.40 In a bold move in 2009, the Bangladesh Parliament adopt-
ed a resolution to try persons accused for crimes under the 1973 Act.  
The Resolution provides for individuals and groups to be tried, in-
stitutes an appeal process and includes English as an official language of 
the court along with Bengali.41 While these amendments are designed to 
ensure that the ICT-BD’s process accords with international standards, 
there is still a long way to go. Several provisions of the 1973 Act have 
been criticised for being insufficient with regards to ensuring that interna-
tional standards of fairness and due process are met.42 
After all, the demands for fairness and justice should not centre ex-
clusively on victims, with scant regard to the corollary rights of alleged 
perpetrators. In order to achieve a justice system free of what has been 
termed an “impartiality deficit”, its statutory foundation must allude to the 
                                                   
37
 Liberation War Museum, “The Museum”, available at http://liberationwarmuseum. 
org/the-museum, last accessed on 19 October 2012. 
38
 Liberation War Museum, “The Museum”, available at http://liberationwarmuseum. 
org/programs, last accessed on 19 October 2012. 
39
  D’Costa, 2011, p. 153, see supra note 1. 
40
  Members of this group under the name Al-Badr allegedly rounded up approxi-
mately 150 academics and journalists and killed them the day before Pakistan’s 
surrender. Mark Dummett, “Bangladesh war crimes stir tension”, BBC News, 30 
June 2008.  
41
  The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973, (‘Act No. XIX of 1973’) 
42
  Human Rights Watch, “Bangladesh: Upgrade War Crimes Law”, 8 July 2009, availa-
ble at http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/07/08/bangladesh-upgrade-war-crimes-law, last 
accessed on 19 October 2012. 
 Old Evidence and Core International Crimes 
 
FICHL Publication Series No. 16 (2012) – page 176 
defence function, equal in status, resources and respect to the judicial, 
administrative and prosecutorial functions.43  
The temporal jurisdiction44 of Article 3(1) is wide, stating that the 
tribunal has jurisdiction over any individual who has committed any of 
the crimes listed “before or after the commencement of [the] act”. The 
subject matter jurisdiction45 of the 1973 Act has also been called into 
question. It permits prosecution for “genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes and other crimes under international law”.  
Commentators have argued that the statute lacks precise definitions 
of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and sexual violence.46 
The extant statutory definitions of these crimes are adapted from the In-
ternational Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) Charter, with certain amend-
ments. For instance, crimes against humanity in the 1973 Act includes 
imprisonment, abduction, confinement, torture and rape. Ethnicity is con-
templated as one of the grounds of discrimination, though it is unclear if 
this will reflect customary international criminal law in this regard.47 The 
last provision, “any other crimes under international law”, is vague and 
may not be held to be consistent with the principle of specificity, an im-
portant tenet of international criminal law.48 
It is noteworthy that the court conceded that it was bound to enforce 
domestic legislation which gives effect to international treaties to which 
Bangladesh is a State Party. However, the tribunal held that it saw no rea-
son to borrow definitions of crimes within its subject-matter jurisdiction, 
from “fairly recent international tribunals”, and that it may only “take into 
account jurisprudential [and normative] developments from other jurisdic-
                                                   
43
  See William A. Schabas, Ramesh Thakur, and Edel Hughes, (eds.), Atrocities and In-
ternational Accountability: Beyond Transitional Justice, United Nations University 
Press, Tokyo, 2007.  
44
  ‘Temporal jurisdiction’ refers to the jurisdiction of a court of law over an action in 
relation to the passage of time.  
45
 ‘Subject-matter jurisdiction’ refers to the authority of a court to hear cases of a partic-
ular type or cases relating to a specific subject matter. 
46
  Jyoti Rahman and Naeem Mohaiemen, “1973 War Crimes Act: Getting it right”, 
The Daily Star, 10 July 2009. 
47
  See Linton, 2010, pp. 231–239, see supra note 28, for an exhaustive treatment on the 
differences between the provisions for the definition of ‘crimes against humanity’.  
48
  Linton, 2010, p. 268, see supra note 28. 
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tions should it feel so required in the interests of justice”.49 With respect, 
this is unsatisfactory as although the ICT-BD is a national tribunal, it 
should have recourse to relevant case law and international standards 
which are widely accepted at both national and international courts.  
It is unclear from the first decision of the ICT-BD, from the way in 
which the charges are described, in the context of the pronouncement 
“that there is a prima facie case against the accused”, whether the judges 
are merely reciting charges by the prosecutor for the accused to hear, read 
and understand, or whether they have agreed that these charges form the 
exclusive and unchallengeable scope of the trial.50 It appears that it is the 
latter – that since a prima facie case has been made against the accused, 
the defence is now being called to answer, which raises significant con-
cerns of perceived impartiality or lack of it.  
In particular, certain charges name suspected victims of rape in 
connection to a crime against humanity, without taking into account 
whether such identification would adversely affect the physical and psy-
chological security of the victim. This is inconsistent with international 
standards and best practises.  
Strikingly, the 1973 Act also fails to guarantee the independence of 
prosecutors and the judiciary or the protection of victims and witnesses.51 
In response to these and other criticisms, the 1973 ICT Act was further 
amended by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure 
(Amendment), 2011 (‘2011 Amendment Act’)52, with provisions guaran-
teeing the rights to: the presumption of innocence53, not to be tried twice 
for the same offence54 , a fair and public hearing with counsel of his 
choice55, trial without undue delay56, be heard in his defence57, not to be 
                                                   
49
 Order issued on 3 October 2011 by the ICT-BD, on file with the author, p. 10.  
50
 There is indication to say that not all the charges were accepted: 20 out of 31 submit-
ted by the prosecutor.  
51
 Ibid.  
52
 International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment), 2011, dated 28 June 
2011.  
53
 Rule 43(2). 
54
 Rule 43(3). 
55
 Rule 43(4). 
56
 Rule 43(5). 
57
 Rule 43(6). 
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compelled to testify or confess his guilt against his will58, to have access 
to the judgment at no cost59, and to be released on bail at any stage of the 
proceedings subject to certain conditions being fulfilled.60  
Importantly, the 2011 Amendment Act also provides for the protec-
tion of victims or witnesses.61 The ICT-BD is authorised to ensure the 
physical well-being of victims/witnesses and to order in-camera-
proceedings to preserve the anonymity of victims/witnesses if that is in 
their best interests.  
The establishment of the tribunal and the earlier amendments to the 
1973 Act should be applauded, and these changes have been heralded as 
positive steps by some legal experts.62 Article 58(A) of the 2011 Amend-
ment Act, for instance, states that the ICT-BD may order government au-
thorities to “ensure [the] protection, privacy and well-being” of vic-
tims/witnesses, and to maintain the confidentiality of this protective pro-
cess.63 The government shall also be required to “arrange accommoda-
tion”, ensure “security and surveillance” during their stay in connection 
with the protective process and take “necessary measures” to ensure that 
law enforcement officials “escort” victims/witnesses to the courtroom.64 
Where proceedings are held in camera, the prosecution and defence coun-
sel are also required to maintain the confidentiality of the proceeding and 
any related information, including the identity of the victims/witnesses.65 
Before assessing the potential efficacy of these recent amendments 
in facilitating the gathering of old evidence from victims/witnesses, it 
would be appropriate to consider another historical conflict and attendant 
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  Rule 43(7). 
59
  Rule 43(4). 
60
  Rule 34(3). 
61
  Rule 58(A); I understand that drafters of the 2011 Amendment Act benefited from the 
expertise of, among others, the University of California Berkeley’s International Hu-
man Rights Law Clinic directed by Clinical Professor Laurel E. Fletcher. 
62
  See generally “Recommendations made by Stephen J Rapp”, 2011, see supra 
note 2. For the history of the framing of the 1973 Act, see Wali-Ur Rahman, “A 
Brief History of the Framing of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973”, 
Bangladesh Heritage Foundation. 
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  Rule 58(A)(2). 
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ongoing justice process which may offer useful lessons – the of the 
Khmer Rouge crimes and the ECCC. 
10.5  Do Not Fail to Keep Therapeutic Promises: Victims will Lose 
Respect and Confidence 
Led by Pol Pot, who died in 1998, the ultra-Maoist Khmer Rouge emptied 
Cambodia’s cities in a bid to forge an agrarian utopia in the 1970s. Up to 
two million Cambodians died of starvation, overwork and torture or 
were executed during the regime’s 1975–1979 reign. Khmer Rouge 
prison chief Kaing Guek Eav alias ‘Duch’ was convicted for overseeing 
the torture and execution of around 17,000 detainees at Tuol Sleng 
prison, also known as S-21. Four other former senior Khmer Rouge 
leaders are currently being tried for core international crimes at the 
U.N.-backed ECCC, which was formed in 2006 after nearly a decade 
of wrangling between the U.N. and the Cambodian government. 
Cambodia, like Bangladesh, has endured its share of seemingly in-
tractable political impasses amidst allegations that high-ranking officials 
of the ruling government bear responsibility for having ordered or permit-
ted large-scale human rights violations between 1975 and 1979. Notwith-
standing this, the establishment of the ECCC in 2003, the conclusion of 
its first trial in July 2010, and its ongoing trials of four senior Khmer 
Rouge leaders, one of whom was formerly granted a royal amnesty for his 
crimes as part of a political compromise, is expected to attest to the fact 
that there may yet be hope for accountability in Cambodia.  
Under the 2011 Amendment Act, a victim refers to a person who 
has suffered harm as a result of crimes under the ICT-BD’s jurisdiction, 
without limitation as to whether such harm is physical, material or psy-
chological.66 Like the ICT-BD, anyone who has suffered from physical, 
psychological, or material harm as a direct consequence of the crimes 
committed by the Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1979 is considered a 
victim and may apply to become a ‘civil party’ to the proceedings at the 
ECCC.  
                                                   
66
 Article 2(26) of the 2011 Amendment Act states that “‘Victim’ refers to a person who 
has suffered harm as a result of commission of the crimes under section 3(2) of the In-
ternational Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973”. 
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The ECCC’s procedural rules permit an unprecedented degree 
of victim participation that surpasses the Rome Statute. 67 By allow-
ing victims to participate in the trials as ‘civil parties’, the ECCC also 
seeks to involve Cambodians in the pursuit of justice and national recon-
ciliation.68 Civil parties enjoy rights at trial akin to the prosecution and the 
defence. The ECCC’s civil party process thus derives from a victim-
oriented approach to punishment, which suggests that a victim needs to 
tell her story before an impartial judge within the framework of a formal-
ised process in order to feel better.  
Commentators have applauded the ECCC for giving victims a 
robust role, saying that it is a long overdue “recognition, after fifteen 
years of international and hybrid courts like [the ECCC], not to exclude 
victims from the justice that is being dispensed on their behalf”.69 
Kheat Bophal, the former Head of the ECCC Victim’s Unit, claimed 
that participation has the potential to transform Cambodian victims in-
to both agents and beneficiaries of a rule of law culture: 
It is essential for the effectiveness and legitimacy of the 
Court that victims are part of the [Khmer Rouge Tribu-
nal’s] process, and that they have their own voice.  
Participation restores faith in the justice system and provides 
the first hand-satisfaction of making public the harm suf-
fered.  
The process of participation also allows victims the oppor-
tunity to denounce the crimes committed against them and 
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 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (‘Rome Statute’), 17 July 1998, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (entered into force on 1 July 2002). 
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 On 12 June 2007, the ECCC’s Judicial Committee on the Rules of Procedure, 
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In theory, the notion that victims benefit from participation is diffi-
cult to dispute, but, as we shall see, in practice victim participation has 
significant limits. Participation is not always a ‘panacea’, nor should the 
trial function as a sort of modern-day ‘degradation ceremony’. 71  As 
Morten Bergsmo has noted, “victims’ interests are variegated”. Victims 
want “not only to have someone convicted, but also to have a court verify 
what exactly the facts were and whether the accused is responsible for 
those acts”, and if others may have been complicit.72  
While not perfect, Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav (‘the Duch case’) 
is noteworthy in this respect. Significantly, the ECCC Trial Chamber did 
not merely pronounce on Duch’s guilt, but upheld his due process rights, 
ruling that his pre-trial detention for more than eight years by the Military 
Court of Cambodia was illegal and merited a reduction in his sentence. At 
the time of writing, the ECCC’s Supreme Court Chamber is to issue its 
first final judgement in relation to the Duch case. The Chamber’s reason-
ing for its decision will be thoroughly examined in the context of the 
Judgement’s implications for strengthening the rule of law in Cambodia.  
The Duch case is of great importance to stability in Cambodia in the 
long run, as in Cambodia the test of legitimacy is not arrests – the Cam-
bodian government knows how to arrest people it does not like – but 
whether ‘fair trials’ can be carried out so Cambodian victims can see that 
justice is possible in their country.  
Bergsmo has added a cautionary note about balancing victims’ in-
terests for truth and justice through adherence to the highest legal profes-
sional and evidentiary standards in court: 
A people should be entitled to its own history, even when 
every detail is not documented. Yet, in comparison higher 
standards of evidence should apply to core international 
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 Interview with Kheat Bophal, Head of the Victim’s Unit at ECCC, Access Vic-
tims’ Rights Working Group Bulletin, Spring 2008, vol. 11, p. 4.
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 See, generally, James Cockayne, “Hybrids or Mongrels? Internationalized War 
Crimes Trials as Unsuccessful Degradation Ceremonies”, in Journal of Human 
Rights, 2005, vol. 4; and Harold Garfinkel, “Conditions of Successful Degradation 
Ceremonies”, in American Journal of Sociology, 1956, vol. 61, no. 5, pp. 420–424. 
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 Morten Bergsmo, “Using Old Evidence in Core International Crimes”, FICHL Policy 
Brief Series, 2011, no. 6, p. 4. 
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crimes processes, where penalties are particularly severe. If 
old evidence should not be an excuse not to prosecute, it re-
quires greater caution. The fact that it relates to events car-




Complexities arise when this caution is cast aside. They are com-
pounded when promises are made to victims about their role in formal ac-
countability and truth-telling process, which are not honoured. These 
complexities have occurred at the ECCC, and should then be carefully ex-
amined. In particular, I have encountered significant problems in connec-
tion with victim-oriented approaches being misunderstood or misapplied 
at the ECCC, which the ICT-BD’s affiliates may wish to consider.  
The ECCC’s civil party process derives from a victim-centred ap-
proach to punishment, which suggests that a victim needs to tell her story 
before a decision-maker within the framework of a formalised process in 
order to feel better.74 Suggestions abound about the soothing effects of 
participation.  
To Naomi Roht-Arriaza, victims gain “a sense of control, an ability 
to lessen their isolation and be reintegrated into their community, and the 
possibility of finding meaning through participation in the process”.75 For 
Jamie O’Connell, participation may also restore a victim’s dignity by giv-
ing him “a sense of agency and capacity to act that the original abuse 
sapped”.76 More than testifying as a witness, playing a role in the prosecu-
tion is said to “assist victims to take back control of their lives and to en-
sure that their voices are heard, respected, and understood”.77 Leila Sadat 
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 Bergsmo, 2011, p. 4, see supra note 59.  
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  Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Interna-
tional Law and Practice, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 21. The author notes: “[…] 
more formalized procedures, including the ability to have an advocate and to confront 
and question their victimizers, may be more satisfying for victims than less formal, 
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 Roht-Arriaza, 1995, p. 19, see supra note 61; see also Raquel Aldana-Pindell, “An 
Emerging Universality of Justiciable Victims’ Rights in the Criminal Process to Cur-
tail Impunity for State-Sponsored Crimes”, in Human Rights Quarterly, 2004, vol. 26. 
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 Jamie O’Connell, “Gambling with the Psyche: Does Prosecuting Human Rights Vio-
lators Console Their Victims?”, in Harvard International Law Journal, 2005, vol. 46 
The author quotes from a telephone interview with Mary Fabri, clinical psychologist. 
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 Yael Danieli, “Victims: Essential Voices at the Court”, Victims Rights Working 
Group, London, U.K., 2004, p. 6. 
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notes that war crimes trials “will not only provide a forum for the particu-
lar defendant but also an arena in which the victims may be heard”.78 
In short, participation is equated with “truth-telling”, which is held 
out as being fundamentally and necessarily beneficial, validating the vic-
tims’ experience and permitting them to heal.79 Yet, legal justice is often 
too “thin” to support therapeutic goals. The notion that victims benefit 
from participation is powerful but it should be closely examined if tribu-
nals wish to send the right message to victims. 
 Based on conversations with and observations of Cambodian vic-
tims and civil parties at the ECCC, it is my view that unless modestly 
conveyed and properly managed, the message of victim participation can 
devolve into a rhetorical device.80 A device that soothes the ECCC’s affil-
iates and donors, but not all victims, some of whom complain that their 
token participation in the ECCC trial proceedings has “revive(d) memo-
ries, bitterness and misery”, and engendered a “loss of faith in the 
ECCC”.81  
Despite being a hybrid court based in Phnom Penh, the ECCC has 
at times externalised justice away from Cambodian victims. The ECCC’s 
promise that victims have a place in the proceedings results in heightened 
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 Leila Nadya Sadat, “Redefining Universal Jurisdiction”, in New England Law Review, 
2001, vol. 35, pp. 241–263. 
79
 Judith Lewis Herman, Trauma and Recovery, Basic Books, New York, 1992, p. 181. 
The authors note: “The fundamental premise of psychotherapeutic work [with survi-
vors of severe trauma] is a belief in the restorative power of truth-telling”. 
80
 See generally, Mahdev Mohan and Vani Sathisan, “Erasing the Non-Judicial Narra-
tive: Victim Testimonies at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal”, in Jindal Global Law Re-
view, 2011, vol. 2, issue 2; and Mahdev Mohan, “The Paradox of Victim-Centrism – 
Victim Participation at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal”, in International Criminal Law 
Review, 2009, vol. 5.  
81
 Press Release, Victims’ Press Conference at the ECCC, Victims Voice their Hopes 
and Concerns about ECCC (3 December 2009), on file with author: 
We hope participation in this process will provide us with some re-
lief, a sense that justice has been done and an understanding of our 
history; but it also revives memories, bitterness, and misery. We 
began with hope that the ECCC would provide some satisfaction, 
but we are now concerned about the delays, the allegations of cor-
ruption, the sufficiency of available resources, and the lack of in-
formation on the progress made by the ECCC and prospects for 
our involvement. These problems prompt many of us to lose hope 
and faith in the ECCC. 
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disillusionment for victims when the process turns out to be unreceptive 
to and incompatible with their subjective impressions, general reminis-
cences, emotions and renditions of truth.82  
Some Cambodian civil parties have been disillusioned because the 
court process has turned out to be unreceptive to and incompatible with 
their subjective impressions, emotions and renditions of truth. Others who 
have applied to become civil parties but have been told that their applica-
tions are inadmissible for jurisdictional reasons – for instance, because the 
crimes they suffered took place outside the 1975–1979 timeline – have 
felt affronted because their status and identity as victims has been ques-
tioned. Still others wish to speak in their own voice in court rather than 
through prosecutors and are distraught when the evidence they take pains 
to re-tell do not make their way to the official record.83  
Historically, the indigenous lowland Khmers or ‘Khmer Krom’ 
have been a marginalised minority group due to their geographical, histor-
ical, and cultural ties to both Cambodia and Vietnam. Their distinct iden-
tity also made the Khmer Krom community the target of crimes during 
the Khmer Rouge regime. In the Khmer Krom heartland of the Bakan dis-
trict, Pursat province, up to 80 percent of the community was singled out 
and slaughtered en masse by the Khmer Rouge, who considered them to 
be traitors associated with the Vietnamese – persons with “Khmer bodies 
but Vietnamese minds”. This was a calculated mass murder with some 
chilling parallels to the notorious Srebrenica Massacre of 1995 in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  
Yet, for the past two years, the Khmer Krom community has re-
mained a blind-spot for the Investigating Judges and Co-Prosecutors at 
the ECCC, who have repeatedly failed to acknowledge their evidence. In 
January 2010, the ECCC’s co-investigating judges decided to charge the 
suspects for crimes against Cambodia’s Cham Muslim and ethnic Viet-
namese minorities, but not the Khmer Krom – ethnic Khmers with roots 
in southern Vietnam. This omission stemmed in part from the prosecu-
tion’s exclusion of the Khmer Krom from its investigation, which left the 
tribunal’s judges unable to pursue such charges, despite compelling 
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evidence of mass killing and forced displacement of the Khmer Krom 
throughout Cambodia.84  
However, Khmer Krom survivors continued to press their case with 
the court, submitting extensive evidence of the atrocities they suffered and 
detailing prison sites and mass graves. These efforts paid off. 
On 13 June 2010, the ECCC’s international co-prosecutor Andrew 
Cayley reached out to Khmer Krom survivors. Meeting for the first time 
with nearly 200 of them in Pursat Province, on the grounds of a pagoda 
where Khmer Krom had been executed, Cayley acknowledged the need to 
present to the court the atrocities committed against the Khmer Krom 
people.  
On 17 June 2011, Mr. Cayley lived up to his word. He filed “Re-
quest for Investigative Action and Supplementary Submission” which 
adds additional crimes to a new case at the court (Case 004), including 
crimes committed against the Khmer Krom population in Takeo and Pur-
sat provinces, based primarily on civil party evidence. 
Now, at the time of writing, more than 130 Khmer Krom survivors 
will have an opportunity to participate in the next trial of senior Khmer 
Rouge leaders, which is expected to begin at the end of the month. Their 
evidence, which has thus far not been documented, could also become the 
centre-piece of Cases 003/004.  
As one civil party eruditely put it when speaking to court officials,  
Give me, give us [civil parties] the voice that you promised. 
Do not play with the hearts and the souls of the victims and 
my (dead) parents. Justice must be transparent, if not it will 




For its part, the ECCC fearing an onslaught of 3,866 Cambodians 
who have been admitted as civil parties in the next case, all jostling for an 
opportunity to address the court, has back-pedalled on several of the 
rights it originally conferred to civil parties. All in all, the civil party pro-
                                                   
84
 The ECCC grounded its decision partly on a technicality. Months before, prosecutors 
had sent a memorandum to investigating judges about possible genocide against 
Khmer Krom in the Pursat province. They entitled the memorandum an “investigative 
request” rather than a “supplementary submission”. The latter title would have trig-
gered an investigation. 
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cess promises far more than it can deliver. Legal accountability processes 
often buckle under the strain of supporting ambitious therapeutic or re-
storative goals. The ECCC and other accountability processes should in-
stead abide by their foundational goal of delivering accountability under 
the law. To ask more of it may be asking too much of any criminal trial. 
Restorative justice may better reside with complementary processes that 
can be more receptive to strategies that commemorate victims in the non-
legal arena using pre-existing traditions that are communicated in a man-
ner that resonate with victims.  
As we shall see, practice at the ECCC offers important lessons to 
the ICT-BD on the inherent challenges of eliciting ‘old evidence’ from 
victims or witnesses; how to gather credible old evidence from them; and 
the protective processes that ought to be supported and strictly enforced 
when seeking to inspire victims/witnesses to come forward to share their 
traumatic narratives with the tribunal.  
10.6. Beware the Taint of Sham Trials and Selective Justice:  
Send the Message that Trials are Independent 
Notwithstanding the recent legislative amendments and the confidence 
they are meant to inspire in Bangladeshi victims/witnesses, there are like-
ly to remain significant challenges in eliciting old evidence for the core 
crimes charged. This is not because the ICT-BD’s affiliates and lawyers 
are saviours who “know best” or have to deal with victims who are 
powerless, helpless innocents whose naturalist attributes have been ne-
gated.86 As Mutua notes, that presumption, which has at times unwit-
tingly informed the larger international criminal justice process, is of-
ten as flawed as it is offensive. On the contrary, victims or witnesses 
are keenly aware of the possible risks that their testimony may in-
volve. After all, piecemeal investigations or purported laws promising 
protection but that may not be enforced are problematic in the eyes of 
Bangladeshi victims who have historical reasons not to trust any exer-
cise that resembles official information gathering. 
Victims of mass crimes which transpired over three decades ago 
and who have not benefited from timely justice processes and legal reme-
dies are keenly aware of the fact that such processes and remedies, when 
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 Makau Mutua, “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights”, in 
Harvard International Law Journal, 2001, vol. 42, p. 201. 
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promised, may be but a mirage. Despite the due process guarantees that 
have been introduced by the above-mentioned legislative amendments, 
other extant constitutional provisions send a different message.  
Under Article 47(A) of the Bangladesh Constitution, traditional fair 
trial rights which are accorded to all other citizens have been deliberately 
withdrawn from persons detained, suspected or charged in connection 
with crimes within the scope of the 1973 ICT Act. Linton highlights addi-
tional difficulties undermining due process, as well as concerns over the 
retention of the death penalty – all of which do not augur well for the le-
gitimacy of the ICT-BD in the eyes of the victims whose evidence it is 
mean to elicit.87 As Linton notes, “such considerations could have en-
riched and improved the Bangladeshi law in the amendments of 2009, in a 
way that is consistent with the overarching principle of legality”.88 
 Steven Kay too has been moved to lament as follows:  
The overall effect of these measures was to put persons ques-
tioned, detained, suspected of committing crimes or charged 
with crimes within the International Crimes (Tribunal) Act 
1973 outside the norms of the national legal system. For the 
first time inequality has been introduced into the Bangladesh 




War crimes courts cannot apply justice selectively and all applica-
ble legislation undergirding the ICT-BD’s judicial process should be har-
monised. The process and the victims it seeks to vindicate are not helped 
by anything which may resemble a ‘degradation ceremony’, regardless of 
how heinous the alleged crimes may be. In fact, the greatest danger to 
such a process is the perception that it may be denouncing certain groups, 
whilst implicitly condoning others that are equally or more culpable.  
Such a perception robs the court of its legitimacy in the eyes of lo-
cal and international stakeholders and undermines its goals. This is pre-
cisely what happened when Pol Pot and Khmer Rouge Foreign Minister, 
Ieng Sary, were tried in absentia for genocide and other international 
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crimes in 1979 by the so-called People’s Revolutionary Tribunal (‘PRT’) 
established by the Vietnamese-installed Heng Samrin administration.90  
Although foreign lawyers had been invited to serve as prosecutors 
and defence counsel in order to “reflect international standards of justice” 
and thereby enhance the legitimacy of the proceedings, the PRT was not 
well received by local and international stakeholders. The short duration 
of the trial, the denial of due process rights to the defendants who were 
convicted in absentia and a poor defence combined to create the impres-
sion of mob justice. These factors created the impression of “primitive po-
litical justice” which was seen to be “akin to the Stalinist show trials of 
the 1930s”.91 Many Cambodian victims of the Khmer Rouge regime saw 
the trial as an assertion of Vietnamese sovereignty over Cambodia. The 
reaction in the West to the verdict was conspicuous silence – all it com-
manded was two square inches in the back pages of the New York Times.  
In contrast, the U.N.-backed ECCC was established by virtue of a 
great deal of patience and skilful negotiation. Cold War politics and com-
peting national interests impeded the establishment of a tribunal to try 
Khmer Rouge leaders throughout the 1980s. Painstaking negotiations 
among the U.N., various member states and Cambodia over much of the 
ensuing decade reflected a mixture of – depending on the government in 
question – ambivalence, conflicting priorities and/or active hostility to the 
tribunal.  
Despite this, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, himself formerly 
a Khmer Rouge cadre, was moved in 1997 to request the U.N. to assist in 
bringing senior Khmer Rouge leaders to book through war crimes trials. 
Mr. Hun Sen invited international participation in the trials due to the 
weakness of the Cambodian legal system and the international nature of 
the crimes, and to help in meeting international standards of justice.  
Until the requisite political will and donor support aligned to permit 
the creation of the ECCC, the idea of a U.N.-backed tribunal was kept 
alive by a variety of diplomats, other actors at the U.N., INGOs and Cam-
bodian NGOs, including, among others, the Office of the High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights, U.S. Senator John Kerry, U.S. Ambassador-at-
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large for War Crimes, David Scheffer, the Director of Genocide Watch, 
Gregory Stanton, academics from the Yale Genocide Program, and Cam-
bodian civil society leaders such as Youk Chhang, Director of the Docu-
mentation Centre for Cambodia (‘DC-Cam’).  
International negotiators and experts, such as the Group of Experts, 
which was established by the U.N. Secretary-General in 1999, were in-
strumental in laying the foundation for the present day tribunal. At times, 
they settled for a compromise, such as when the U.N. decided against the 
Group’s recommendation of establishing an ad hoc tribunal pursuant to 
the U.N. Security Council’s powers under Chapter VII of the U.N. Char-
ter to restore international peace and security, and instead established a 
hybrid tribunal situated in Cambodia so that local communities could bet-
ter identify with the process.  
On other occasions, negotiators stood firm, such as when the U.N. 
withdrew from negotiations with Cambodia in 2002 because negotiations 
had failed and the Cambodian court would not guarantee impartiality and 
independence, which is required for U.N. co-operation. Finally, the ECCC 
was established in 2003 with U.N.’s chief negotiator, Under-Secretary 
General Hans Corell, stating that the ECCC’s foundational documents and 
processes were “designed to ensure a fair and public trial by an independ-
ent and impartial court”.92  
Mr. Corell’s faith in the ECCC was vindicated earlier last year 
when the ECCC’s Trial Chamber delivered its first judgment in the Duch 
case – a well-reasoned decision which has been praised for its sound 
treatment of the facts before the court. Had the ECCC been rushed into 
action ahead of its time, rather than through a phased-in approach over 
several years, or had international negotiators caved in to pressure to al-
low national judges to have greater say in deciding cases rather than en-
suring that decisions will require a ‘super-majority’ to be conclusive, it is 
likely that any chance of securing justice would have been scuttled out-
right or led to results that would not have been viewed as credible, fair or 
impartial by national and international stakeholders alike. This is note-
worthy for the ICT-BD. 
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It is striking that despite the more than 30 years that have elapsed 
since the fall of the Khmer Rouge, the trials now underway are broadly 
considered meaningful and important by the Cambodian public. Despite 
the long delay, the general public followed the Duch trial with great inter-
est, as indicated, among other things, by the very large television viewing 
audience the trial attracted. While a delay in justice is hardly advisable as 
a matter of course, it is important to bear in mind that justice delayed is 
not always justice denied – war crimes trials that come long after a con-
flict may nonetheless enjoy very considerable public support and may op-
erate to promote reasoned reflection upon the past. Having said this, it is 
too early to tell whether, as some ECCC affiliates argue, the trials will in 
themselves make a significant contribution to societal reconciliation by 
‘healing’ survivors. 
Tribunals such as the ECCC have grand ambitions of delivering 
“justice”, in the broadest sense of the word. Judging by continued obsta-
cles to accountability at the ECCC, however, it appears justice does not 
come easy or cheap. Even though the trials have begun, Cambodians face 
a long road to justice. At the time of writing, the final two cases pending 
before the ECCC, referred to as Cases 003/004, were submitted for judi-
cial investigation in September 2009 and concern former Khmer Rouge 
cadres who are part of or are closely associated with the ruling political 
party and the Hun Sen administration.93 Unsurprisingly, little has been 
done since, due in no small part to the reluctance of national investigators 
to co-operate.  
The reluctance of the ECCC’s top Cambodian investigators to pro-
ceed with Cases 003/004 is likely in response to statements from high 
ranking Cambodian officials indicating that these trials should not go 
forward. The clearest example of ostensible interference came from Prime 
Minister Hun Sen when he told the UN Secretary-General, “Case 003 will 
not be allowed […]. The court will try the four senior leaders successfully 
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Cases Head for Closure”, 11 May 2011, available at http://www.robertcarmichael. 
net/Robert_Carmichael/Radio/Entries/2011/5/11_Tribunals_credibility_under_threat_
as_controversial_cases_head_for_closure.html, last accessed on 19 October 2012; 
James A. Goldston, “Justice Delayed and Denied”, in New York Times, 13 October 
2011, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/14/opinion/14iht-edgoldston 
14.html?_r=1, last accessed 9 October 2012. 
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and then finish with Case 002”.94 At the time of writing, the international 
Co-Investigating Judge resigned from his post, ostensibly in protest 
against his inability to make headway in Cases 003/004.95 Both cases 
have attracted an overwhelming amount of criticism from commentators 
due to the serious and consistent allegations of political interference by 
the Cambodian Government. In the last years several senior ECCC offi-
cials have resigned from their posts citing the government’s interference 
as making it impossible for them to carry out their functions.96  
Despite the success of the first trial before the ECCC the current 
controversy aroused by the Prime Minister’s remarks threatens to under-
mine the tribunal’s legitimacy. If in fact the cases now under investigation 
are not permitted to go forward because of political interference, the tri-
bunal will be seen as having failed both to provide accountability and to 
serve as a model of the rule of law for Cambodia. The lesson we can 
glean from this is that if the independence, impartiality, and effectiveness 
of an accountability mechanism cannot be guaranteed at its inception, the 
expectations of victims may be disappointed and the culture of impunity 
may be reinforced rather than overcome. 
This lesson is particularly apposite in Bangladesh as genuine con-
cerns have been expressed by victims that the ICT-BD trials could be ad-
vanced by the current administration to gain political or electoral mileage, 
and if there is a change in power, the ICT-BD may be strangled at birth. 
Like the suspects in Cases 003/004 at the ECCC, many of the suspects 
and accused persons at the ICT-BD have long-standing political ties.97 
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  “Hun Sen to Ban Ki-moon: Case 002 last trial at ECCC”, in Phnom Penh Post, 27 
October 2010.  
95
  See the following reports by civil society members that called for (and achieved) this 
resignation due to the fact that the ECCC has not made any progress on cases 
003/004: Open Society Justice Initiative, Recent Developments at the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: June 2011 Update, available at http://www.so 
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cambodia-eccc-20110614.pdf; Human Rights Watch, “Cambodia: Judges Investigat-
ing Khmer Rouge Crimes Should Resign”, 3 October 2011, available at http:// 
www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/03/cambodia-judges-investigating-khmer-rouge-crimes-
should-resign, last accessed on 3 October 2012.  
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  See Human Rights Watch, ibid.  
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Economist, 24 March 2011, available at http://www.economist.com/node/18446875, 
last accessed on 3 October 2012. 
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Bangladeshi victims would not be alone in harbouring such suspicions, as 
expert commentators too have argued that the trials may be politically 
motivated, calculated to shift focus away from other issues which impair 
the current administration’s political control.98 
As Ambassador Rapp notes, it is “important that the trials be carried 
out in a way that will stand the test of time”. 99 While this is far easier said 
than done, no effort should be spared in order to insulate the tribunal from 
political interference. The best tool for such insulation is for the tribunal 
to adhere to domestic and international legal standards which will help it 
make clear that it is a separate and independent body within the judicial 
branch of government that is beyond executive interference. 
It is important, therefore, that the ICT-BD’s affiliates have modesty 
of ambition when it comes to devising and calibrating its’ process. In 
view of the current political climate in Bangladesh, and the historical lens 
through which the ICT-BD may be viewed by victims and the internation-
al community, I suggest that the ICT-BD ensure that its legal and judicial 
officials possess the requisite training and resources to ensure that the 
process is seen to fruition and comports with Bangladeshi law and inter-
national law and standards.  
For a start, the ICT-BD’s practical challenges and capacity con-
straints must be anticipated and addressed. It has been reported that ap-
proximately USD $1.5 million has been approved by the Cabinet for the 
trial.100 Yet, the elements of the legal process covered by the budget are 
unclear and the sheer scope of crimes and alleged criminals within its ju-
risdiction is staggering.101 The ECCC has done well to have planned for 
similar exigencies102 so that it could have deployed its resources more ef-
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 The ECCC plans to spend close to $200 million to try five defendants; a process it 
anticipates could take until March 2014. That is a big increase from the court’s initial 
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fectively in the last five years. The ICT-BD should not repeat the ECCC’s 
mistakes in this regard. 
As intuitive as it may be to commence war crimes trials, absent sys-
tematic investigations, sufficient resources and sustained political will, or 
an adequate mandate and principled completion strategy, such trials may 
be mired in challenges. They may also divert precious attention and re-
sources from achievable restorative goals. Criminal prosecution is just 
one element in a toolbox of post-conflict justice and accountability. In any 
given context, those who seek accountability must closely examine their 
objectives to ensure that the mix of tools they select is best tailored to the 
particular need. Exaggerating what just one tool – prosecution – can rea-
sonably accomplish may mean that other avenues which are more mean-
ingful and effective are not explored or are prematurely foreclosed.  
10.7. Investigate, Document and Preserve: Send the Message  
that Victims’ Narratives Matter  
Another innovative way to bolster the ICT-BD’s legitimacy would be for 
it to make appropriate reference to and rely on other independent and 
complementary transitional justice processes which may be well-received 
by Bangladeshi victims. The experience in Cambodia points to the key 
role that civil society may play. The lessons from these contexts indicate 
that international practitioners who wish to engage in investigation and 
documentation of alleged mass atrocities are more likely to succeed if 
they engage and work with local experts who enjoy the trust and confi-
dence of victims and, in some cases, of at least some governmental actors. 
In my experience partnering with local experts in a respectful and con-
structive manner is a necessary pre-requisite for gaining a sound legal and 
forensic understanding of the nature of the mass atrocities, their scale, and 
their geographical sweep. This sets the foundation stone for proper docu-
mentation of victim narratives, which will in turn form the basis for com-
parative assessment and corroboration of new testimonial evidence of old 
crimes which may emerge in the course of the ICT-BD’s investigations 
and trials. 
                                                                                                                        
and the former Yugoslavia, which have cost about $150 million a year. The Cambodi-
an side of the court has begun to run out of money to pay salaries, but donors have yet 
to publicly commit funds for fear that the funds will be siphoned away by corrupt of-
ficials at the highest levels. 
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In Cambodia, leading local NGOs have assisted in interviewing 
vulnerable survivor communities and put forward data that has assisted 
the ECCC to charge defendants for crimes such as genocide and forced 
marriage, which were hitherto unknown to ECCC prosecutors.103 By way 
of analogy, the ICT-BD’s affiliates should look to NGOs in Cambodia 
such as DC-Cam which was first established by international funding and 
supported by academic research, to conduct research, documentation and 
training on the Khmer Rouge Regime. DC-Cam and the Tuol Sleng Mu-
seum serve as the principal sources of evidentiary material for the ECCC. 
DC-Cam’s very inception can be traced back to a statute passed by the 
U.S. Congress in April 1994 – the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act – that 
led to the establishment of the Yale Genocide Program in the U.S., and to 
the birth of DC-Cam in 1997.  
The organisation’s motto, “searching for the truth”, gives it the aura 
of an investigative entity tasked with finding, corroborating and recording 
facts. DC-Cam’s Director, Youk Chhang, emphasised this when he told 
the press, “They say that time heals all wounds, but time alone can do 
nothing. You will always have time. To me, research heals. Knowing and 
understanding what happened has set me free”.104 In its methodical ap-
proach to gathering data, we observe how DC-Cam is “analysing an oral 
text, and correlating it with other, written documents and other pieces of 
information” to “‘restore’ the text to its ‘original’ version, and situate this 
version in its social context, establishing the particular perspective on the 
past that the ‘oral document’ takes”.105  
As the nation’s primary repository of documents relating to the 
Khmer Rouge that provided the ECCC with its secondary evidence, we 
ask how the very act of “searching for the truth” has been significantly in-
fluenced by DC-Cam. The lesson to be learnt here is that under the right 
circumstances a limited and well-calibrated mandate to document and 
preserve old evidence can achieve success in establishing the truth, while 
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a broader mandate might well undermine it, regardless how noble its in-
tentions. 
Nevertheless, despite the best efforts of archives and libraries in 
Cambodia and elsewhere, over the years much evidence of and witnesses 
to the Cambodian ‘killing fields’ have been destroyed, disappeared or per-
ished and unfortunately will not form part of Cambodia’s historical rec-
ord.106 For victims of mass violence who have now come forward to give 
evidence, including their testimony in the ECCC’s legal record or in some 
other virtual space which acts as a repository of their important narratives 
and aspirations may become the only formal acknowledgment they will 
receive of the atrocities they endured under the Khmer Rouge regime.107 
The ICT-BD should explore similar initiatives. ECCC International Co-
Prosecutor Andrew Cayley puts it well:  
[I]t is crucial that evidence be documented as soon as possi-
ble and as regularly as possible thereafter. This documenta-
tion should be preserved in a form which will permit it to be 
understood and interpreted. Also it is very important that 
original documents be retained and that chains of custody are 
able to be proven. 
With regard to crimes committed decades ago […] the above 
circumstance may not be present; however those prosecuting 
international crimes should seek out interested persons and 
organizations that have been collecting evidence from the 
relevant period. Furthermore, electronic data systems and 
other advanced technologies should be used to discover, pre-
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 Tuol Sleng has been in a state of gross disrepair, with inadequate facilities to house 
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serve, organize, analyze and disseminate evidence of crimes. 




Archivists at the Liberation War Museum and related documenta-
tion organisations in Bangladesh should work towards interviewing po-
tential witnesses, identifying and analysing narratives of survival, secur-
ing important primary evidence, implementing measures to prevent the 
destruction of documents and forensic evidence, and providing a basis to 
begin to confront the conflict and its consequences. By identifying and 
preserving evidence, both through traditional and electronic means, this 
archive may yet make a significant contribution to the success of future 
prosecutions. 
10.8. Engage but Do Not Over-burden Civil Society: Send  
the Message that there is a Distinction between Judicial  
and Non-Judicial Actors 
Investigation and documentation of alleged mass atrocities can be led by 
formal or informal truth and reconciliation commissions and referenda, by 
civil society, or by researchers at academic and documentation institutions 
dedicated to contemporaneous data collection and analysis. Where effec-
tive formal judicial accountability mechanisms are stalled, transitional 
justice processes devoted to truth and reconciliation can nonetheless pro-
vide a foundation for sustained accountability, not to mention strengthen 
local legal capacity and justice institutions which maintain the rule of law.  
The lessons from Cambodia show how important the role of civil 
society can be in locating and preserving the documentary record of a 
conflict. Ideally, collaborative civil society and court initiatives can make 
use of that documentary record and victim testimonies and narratives for 
education, for assisting victims to come to terms with the past, and for 
fathoming how to prevent and deter mass atrocities.  
Yet, compulsory truth-telling is not always effective or well-
received in Asian or non-Judeo-Christian societies, where speech may be 
seen as performative and not necessarily consistent with justice and rec-
onciliation.  
An initiative spearheaded by a Cambodian NGO a few years ago is 
instructive in this regard. From 2006 to 2008, the Centre for Social De-
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velopment (‘CSD’) sought to create an outreach programme that was one 
of the most ambitious and far-reaching efforts by any NGO at that junc-
ture. Its then Executive Director, Theary Seng, stated during one such 
public forum that “[…] the goal is to broaden the conversational space 
and to put down the burden of the past, which many have carried silently 
for too long. In that sense, ours is an informal truth and reconciliation 
commission”.109  
The combined effect of these informal public forums and the legal 
outreach work of civil society organisations in the context of the ECCC is 
to extol “truth telling” and positivist ideas of the law as the main paths to 
reconciliation. As one Cambodian victim said during one of these forums, 
“[w]e need clear and exact facts/cases from Cambodian people. In the 
past they did not collect written evidence but they can tell what they have 
suffered. But in law it is not enough to be regarded as evidence, so it’s not 
relevant”.110  
Several difficulties arose in the course of this civil society organisa-
tion (‘CSO’) initiative, which typify legal outreach and informal transi-
tional justice processes that CSOs have conducted in Cambodia.  
First, as the victim’s quote above demonstrates, the discourse of 
truth-telling has become synonymous with ‘facts’ established within the 
court of law, rather than ‘truth’ and is evidenced by the sorts of impas-
sioned remarks made by victims at non-judicial fora: in the course of pub-
lic forums, press interviews and civil society meetings. If allowed to over-
reach themselves, CSO-led non-judicial truth-telling processes may often 
become freighted with the same baggage that weighs heavily upon judi-
cial war crimes trials – id est, a desire to compel a population that pre-
ferred to heal through forgetting into “truth-telling subjects who would, 
after adequate sensitization, recognize their ‘need’ to talk about the vio-
lence”.111  
However, when CSOs take a legal tone it has a profound impact on 
how people are expressing their memories; how they understand justice 
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and the law. As Rosalind Shaw aptly stated with regards to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone,  
[d]ifferent regions and localities, moreover, have their own 
memory practices and often their own techniques of social 
recovery that may have developed during the course of their 
own history. How do these practices intersect with public 
truth telling during a truth commission?
112
  
In the case of Sierra Leone, Shaw indicates that local practices were 
largely focused on “forgiving and forgetting” and that “valorizing verbal-
ly discursive remembering” was problematic as a result. 
Shaw’s words are apposite in the ECCC context as well. Even if she 
was referring to a truth and reconciliation commission and not a tribunal 
as is the case in Cambodia, the combined effect of these informal public 
forums and the legal outreach work of CSOs in the context of the ECCC 
is to extol “truth telling” and positivist ideas of the law as the main paths 
to reconciliation. Non-judicial initiatives which seek to establish a histori-
cal record and smooth out the creases of conflicting versions of the truth 
or collective memory in the public’s mind can be antithetical to the vic-
tim’s desire to disclose vital nuanced truths and layered memories which 
depart from the ‘standard total view’.113  
Insisting on forming or adhering to collective memory can also run 
contrary to the judicial endeavour. In other words, judges cannot presume 
to accept ‘facts of public notoriety’ which have not been established as 
agreed or probative facts in accordance with the applicable standard of 
proof.114 




 Michael Vickery, Cambodia 1975–1982, South End Press, Boston, 1984.  
114
 Bergsmo, 2011, p. 3, see supra note 72; ECCC Supreme Court Judge Agnieszka 
Klonowiecka-Milart states:  
[beware] the danger of collective memory, as forged through sec-
ondary sources such as reports or books. First the demonstration of 
individual criminal responsibility should clearly be distinguished 
from the establishment of the background of facts. Second, tribu-
nals should be very careful in addressing what might be presented 
to them as ‘facts of public notoreity’. Such concepts might serve 
the economy of the trial, but they de facto lower the standard of 
proof. 
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In order to elicit credible old evidence, one must keep in mind what 
remembering and recounting traumatic and deeply personal events entails. 
After all, to remember is to have a “reading” of the past which,  
[…] requires linguistic skills derived from the traditions of 
explanation and story-telling within a culture and which 
[presents] issues in a narrative that owes its meaning ulti-




A key problem in Cambodia is the lack of adequate investigation 
into what local practices are in this regard. Cognizant of this lacuna at the 
ECCC and its attendant processes, the ICT-BD should explore the non-
judicial arena when considering victim-oriented measures premised on re-
storative justice, regardless of how alien that may seem to lawyers. Non-
judicial initiatives which run or will run parallel to the ECCC’s trials give 
victims confidence that restorative justice can be meted outside the court-
room at a spiritual ceremony or ritual, through testimonial therapy, on a 
dramatic stage or through the arts.116 There are informal transitional jus-
tice mechanisms like the Shalish in Bangladesh which is akin to the 
Gacaca in Rwanda which can also be further researched and explored.117 
Second, by taking on the mantle of the court when speaking to vic-
tims about their evidence and using and encouraging the language of the 
law, CSOs externalise their greatest strength – their roots in and connec-
tion to the community and the trust and confidence that this connection 
inspires and the narratives it elicits. Without this connection, victims or 
witnesses will look upon civil society as an extension of the court or the 
government, which is not always beneficial. The proposition that the in-
volvement of judges necessarily makes proceedings more accessible to 
local constituents is doubtful. It has been my experience that Cambodi-
an victims are generally more suspicious of justice initiatives that are 
linked to local authorities and judges, some of whom are regarded as 
corrupt. 
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Third, inexperienced or untrained local CSOs can also miss the 
point and undermine the legal process. Speaking extra-judicially, ECCC 
Supreme Judge Agnieszka Klonowiecka-Milart remarked as follows: 
[Beware of] the frailty of contemporaneously adduced evi-
dence, especially in relation to its physical availability and 
credibility. The latter is especially salient when civil society 
participates in the collection of evidence as its lack of ade-
quate training may impede the process. This is one of the 
reasons why the adversarial nature of the proceedings should 




Non-judicial processes must therefore retain their independence and 
separation from the judicial arena. Suffice it to say that Bangladesh’s na-
tional efforts over the years have not produced authoritative or reliable ev-
idence of the period in question upon which collaborative transitional jus-
tice processes can be based or build upon. The ICT-BD’s affiliates should 
be wary of civil society-led or entirely national commissions of inquiry, 
surveys, referenda or truth commissions which profess to deliver healing. 
However noble the intentions of such commissions or processes may ap-
pear, they are, as mentioned earlier, inherently problematic in complex 
political contexts such as Bangladesh.  
10.9. Retooling Law and Ethnography: Send the Message  
that Victims Deserve Proper Presentation 
What then of the ICT-BD’s adversarial judicial process as a method to 
elicit credible old evidence from Bangladeshi victims? Noting that old ev-
idence is not necessarily bad evidence, ICTY Judge Alphons M.M. Orie 
has suggested the following instructive suggestions on how ICT-BD judg-
es may do so: 
When drawing inferences from the evidence presented, what 
matters the most is to understand the psychological mecha-
nisms underlying such a process, beyond a mere legal ap-
proach. The story of the criminal event needs to be tested in 
all its details, even when conclusions seem easy to draw. The 
search for positive and negative indicia should aim at verify-
ing or falsifying the elements of the story. This sounds even 
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more imperative when inferences rely on witness statements, 
considered as the most ‘vulnerable’ evidence.
119
 
Yet, the judicial arena too is not without its inherent constraints 
which, if lawyers and judges are not careful, result in critical old evidence 
being compromised and the victims who possess them being scarred. The 
experience of Civil Parties in the Duch case is noteworthy in this regard. 
The judicial endeavour of the ECCC, to maintain a legally authoritative 
account of what happened, crippled the participation of the Civil Parties 
as they were excluded from the process of asking questions that were vital 
in aiding them deal with their post-conflict trauma. Several Civil Parties 
were also forced to leave the stand as their identities as victims were ques-
tioned by the Tribunal. During the testimony of Civil Party Mr. Ly Hor,120 
an alleged survivor of S-21, inconsistencies in his account led Duch to 
publicly challenge his identity as a victim.121 Such an experience, scholars 
and trial monitors assert, may “defeat the positive outcomes of participa-
tion and instead lead to re-traumatization”.122 Civil Party Ly Hor took the 
stand only to have his oral testimony and credibility come under fire as it 
deviated materially from both his written statement and the written con-
fession purportedly produced at S-21 that he insisted was his own. Ly 
Hor’s lawyers,123 who appeared none the wiser, were unable to offer any 
satisfactory reason for why the ECCC Trial Chamber should nevertheless 
regard the documents as supportive of Ly Hor’s claim.124 “I suppose you 
would agree with me that this civil party has been very poorly prepared 
for this morning’s experience,” was Judge Sylvia Cartwright’s wry ad-
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monishment to Ly Hor’s lawyers,125 after a morning of questioning that 
saw Ly Hor become visibly and increasingly distressed.126 Also taken to 
task by the Chamber were the lawyers for civil party Nam Mon127 for 
Nam Mon’s belated disclosure of new allegations, which were eventually 
rejected.128  
But to Ly Hor and Nam Mon, the inaccuracy of the written state-
ments was peripheral to the fact that Phaok Khan was able to recount his 
“very interesting” experiences before the Trial Chamber.129 The applica-
tions of Ly Hor and Nam Mon were ultimately rejected by the Trial 
Chamber.130 By rejecting their non-judicial narrative – those parts of their 
stories which did not comply with the legal and evidential requirements of 
the court – the judges gravely underestimated the cost to survivors of lay-
ing bare their personal histories in open court, having their stories public-
ly undermined and their efforts potentially laid to waste. The credibility of 
the civil parties’ testimonies was, in their presence, questioned by the 
Chamber, and more fiercely, by Duch himself, and ultimately discredit-
ed.131 
Attempting then to create a space for victims in the judicial arena 
alone is misguided. Victims recount their stories of pain and distress to an 
audience that is more interested in seeing how these facts neatly fit evi-
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dentiary matrices. In that process, victims’ non-evidentiary voices, claims 
and desires for vindication, are unfortunately not heard and taken into ac-
count, but carelessly side-lined and silenced.  
Rosalind Shaw notes that when interacting with victim communi-
ties, “it is important to examine, through ethnographic rather than quanti-
tative survey methods, the range of practices of conflict resolution and 
reconciliation that people and communities are adapting and retooling 
now”.132  
Like Shaw, I find that ethnography, which mainly consists of ex-
tended periods of participant observation and informal interviews with 
victims, is the most appropriate approach to eliciting genuine narra-
tives and evidence from victims on their terms. Piecemeal investiga-
tions that “get in, extract information, get out” are undoubtedly prob-
lematic in contexts in which victims are emerging from mass violence 
and have historical reasons not to trust any exercise that resembles offi-
cial information gathering. In my experience as a civil party lawyer 
gathering old evidence from Cambodian victims in relation to Case 002 
and putative Cases 003 and 004, I have found that investigation that re-
spects ethnographic field research and its subjects could give access to a 
very different body of knowledge from that accessible to someone who 
examines, documents and evaluates stories of historical trauma from 
mass crime victims.133 In order to find out what my client communities 
want, my legal team and I have had to look beyond the physical space 
of the hearings, evidentiary documents or victim information forms 
prepared by CSO intermediaries and spend time in rural provinces 
talking to people who have never met investigators or prosecutors, or in 
villages from which they had been driven, as well as those in which 
they were welcomed. Ultimately, this form of ethnographic investiga-
tion and lawyering is a useful approach to dealing with victims of mass 
crime as it entails spending time with ordinary people (as opposed to 
court affiliates) and listening to them on their terms – not through the 
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  Shaw, 2005, p. 4, see supra note 111. 
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  Scholars have pondered whether memory can be distilled, with all of the chaff of per-
sonal inhibitions, prejudices and inaccuracies sloughed off, so that one can arrive at 
an accurate picture – indeed, a virtual photographic snapshot – of a particular moment 
in time, at how such stories and narratives remain unclassifiable, incomplete and 
marred with controversy. See generally Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory, 
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medium of our survey forms, or in our sensitisation workshops, or 
through local NGOs and intermediaries. With this general ethos in mind, 
these are my specific recommendations for the ICT-BD’s affiliates 
when they seek to meet with and elicit credible evidence from vul-
nerable Bangladeshi mass crime victims.134 
1) Work with Local Partners. Work with local organisations, which 
enjoy the community’s trust and confidence. Based on the indi-
cations of this intermediary organisation, investigate, trace and 
interview victims who are keen to be civil parties and may be in a 
position to provide valuable evidence or testimony. Nonetheless, 
however good the local NGOs are, it bears mentioning that over-
reliance can marginalise victims who do not wish to speak the 
lingo of NGOs, human rights, and humanitarian assistance. 
2) Identify Focal Sites. Identify geographical locations and sites that 
have been recognised in the existing literature or data currently 
housed at documentation centres and archives that evince a tar-
geted attack against the victims. Trace and map these sites on 
physical documents and note any patterns of alleged crime and 
relevant conduct which may emerge. This will serve as a good 
starting point when speaking with victims and ultimately help es-
tablish or corroborate charges relating to core international 
crimes135. 
3) Adopt a ‘Thick Description’.136 Adopt a qualitative approach that 
views members of the victim community as subjects rather than 
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 For further details, see generally Mahdev Mohan, “Re-constituting the Un-Person”: 
the Khmer Krom and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal”, in Singapore Yearbook of Interna-
tional Law, 2008, vol. 12. 
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  See John Ciorciari, The Khmer Krom and the Khmer Rouge Trials, August 2008, 
online: Documentation Center of Cambodia, available at http://www.dccam.org/Tribu 
nal/Analysis/pdf/Summer_Assn_John_KRT_Khmer_Krom.pdf, last accessed on 19 
October 2012. For example, documents recovered from the Khmer Rouge’s infamous 
Kraing Ta Chan prisonin Takeo province, one of the few provincial prisons to leave 
behind a large trove of paperwork, suggest that the Khmer Krom were frequent sus-
pects of espionage and other counter-revolutionary activities and were singled out for 
torture and imprisonment. According to Dr. Ciorciari, senior legal advisor of DC-
Cam, roughly 1,000 pages of documentary material from Kraing Ta Chan prison are 
on file at DC-Cam. 
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  Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, Basic Books, New 
York, 1973. 
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objects and allows time for interviewers to roll up their sleeves 
and properly document the victims’ genuine historical narrative, 
examine their desires and reservations regarding reparations 
and answer their questions about the process. Only then can we 
hope to arrive at, in Clifford Geertz’s words, a “thick descrip-
tion” of the community that includes information about who they 
are as a people, the context of the crimes they suffered, and their 
present plight and desires for social change. 137  Social scientist 
Roger Henke cautioned me against relying on using quantita-
tive surveys in group settings as a data source; Henke believes 
that country-wide surveys that do not have a qualitative element 
were prone to distortion, bias and mimicry of opinions – “getting 
them altogether in a dreadful focus-group to fill forms is counter-
productive; they may not be forthcoming, some who have been 
made to fill surveys may have rehearsed answers and others may 
echo popular sentiments, leading to a distortion of data”.138 
4) Further Systematic Research. Design concise and clear interview 
questions, in consultation with experienced social scientists who 
have conducted empirical research in Cambodia’s rural and urban 
provinces. Future researchers and investigators should investigate 
the data you have collected in a scientific manner. With more reli-
able field-data, researchers could seek to refine the typology pre-
sented and sharpen the explanations of individual dynamics. 
5) Representation and Reparation. Provide independent legal repre-
sentation to victims. Victims need to have lawyers looking out for 
their rights which may not always coincide with the interests and 
obligations of investigators and prosecutors at the ICT-BD. Victims 
lawyers’ communications with their victim-clients are clothed with 
confidentiality and their role would include conducting interviews 
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 Ibid. As Joseph Ponterotto notes in “Brief Note on the Origins, Evolution, and Mean-
ing of the Qualitative Research Concept”, in The Qualitative Report, 2006, vol. 11, 
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  Author’s Interview with Roger Henke, Institutional Development Specialist, Phnom 
Penh, Cambodia, 5 December 2008. 
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with victims, preparing victim impact statements, collecting and 
analysing evidence where appropriate, and taking instructions 
from and keeping victims informed of the legal proceedings as 
they unfold and with a view of supporting the prosecution of the al-
leged crimes and identifying possible forms of judicial and non-
judicial reparation measures. Having their own legal counsel gives 
victims confidence and insulates them to a degree from the clinical 
rigour of transitional justice processes. It reminds them that there 
are those whose duty it is to have their best interests at heart.  
10.10. Be Sensitive to Vulnerable Victims: Send the Message  
that Victims will be Protected 
For victims of mass crime to feel confident that they can come forward 
and speak to official authorities about traumatic events which may be at-
tributable to persons who occupy or may have occupied political office, it 
is important that they know that the law will be their guardian. The law 
must guarantee their safety, security and well-being before, during and af-
ter their testimony. It is also essential that vulnerable victims are given 
protection not just from physical violence, but also from social pressures 
and stigmas, which can often be far more damaging to their identity and 
place in society. 
 A pre-cursor to the ICT-BD, the Peoples’ Tribunal for Trial of War 
Criminal and Collaborators (‘Gono-Adalot’), was infamously unable to 
insulate victims/witnesses who gave evidence before it from ostracisation 
and remains a cautionary tale to victims/witnesses who may wish to come 
forward to provide evidence. 
Held in 1992, the Gono-Adalot in Dhaka drew close to 200,000 par-
ticipants from across the country. It comprised of several retired and re-
spected judges and heard evidence from a cross-section of the community, 
including four women from a remote area in the Jessore District who pub-
licly testified about the sexual crimes that they had endured and other at-
tacks against their community.139 The testimony of the women contained 
sensitive allegations which illustrated the “failure” of the men in the 
community to protect them and thus their collective honour. In a different 
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context, this testimony and the courage which it took these women to 
come forward to present it, would have been hailed as a local and interna-
tional touchstone for victim-cantered justice. 
Yet, due to a government-sponsored attack on the tribunal, the vic-
tims or witnesses who testified were brought into harm’s way. Unlike the 
other victims or witnesses, these four women were especially socially and 
economically vulnerable. Nonetheless, their photographs were printed in 
the newspapers, and a documentary filmmaker who visited their village 
subsequently discovered that as a result of the exposure of the women in 
the press, they were ostracised by their community, and faced problems 
such as being barred from using the local well, or difficulty finding a suit-
able match for their daughters.140 
These and other vulnerable victims/witnesses of the 1971 sexual vi-
olence experienced “their own narratives being taken over by a broad 
based social movement, without any comprehension of the impact of vio-
lence on their lives, and the failure to provide them with any concrete, le-
gal, financial or moral support”.141 Bina D’Costa and Sara Hossain point 
out that gender sensitivity needs to be maintained even while referring to 
the crimes committed against women during the conflict.142 The crimes 
committed against the women have been largely described in terms of the 
loss to the community, rather than the individual. Additionally, the ques-
tion of whether giving evidence leads to re-traumatisation needs to be ad-
dressed.143 The language and cultural context within which rape and sexu-
al offences is couched is also significant and has a marked expressive ef-
fect. Mujib coined the term ‘Birangona’ to depict the ‘sacrifice’ of the 
women for their country,144 through the roles women played during the 
war, even when this alluded to their being raped or forcibly impregnated. 
Whilst the term was ostensibly intended to provide honour and confer a 
special status on these women, instead it just singled them out for further 
ostracisation.145 Quite clearly, the message understood was far from what 
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was intended, but it is the former that sticks and unwittingly leads to vic-
tims being ‘othered’. 
Unfortunately, these victims are not alone. Chim Math, one of the 
few female survivors of Duch’s notorious Tuol Sleng torture centre in 
Cambodia, underwent a similar fate. In July 2007, a group that was on a 
tour of Tuol Sleng, organied by CSD, identified Chim Math’s photo – one 
of the countless haunting black and white faces of prisoners interred there 
during the Khmer Rouge period. They knew the woman, they said and 
furthermore, she was still alive. A photo-journalist caught wind of the 
conversation and arranged to have Chim Math brought to Tuol Sleng, 
where she stood beside her photo and verified that in fact, she had sur-
vived torture at Tuol Sleng and much more. CSD quickly tasked us with 
drafting a press release to state that CSD, through its ground tours and 
outreach activities, had succeeded in finding the “sole female survivor of 
Tuol Sleng”.146 Chim Math was thrust into the public domain, her original 
name and identity revealed to the world. In a matter of days, she became 
the metaphorical “site” of conflict between a journalist associated with a 
well-known European news agency and CSD on the issue of who had the 
authority to claim they had “discovered” her.147  
If the “resequencing, decontextualizing and suppressing of social 
memory in order to give it new meaning is itself a social process”, I wit-
nessed a victim undergo a profound process.148 In a brief period, Chim 
Math experienced both the terror of public scrutiny and the peculiar sense 
of righteousness that comes from the “duty to remember”. Her case seems 
to hinge a great deal on how accessible the ECCC is to a witness like 
Chim Math and on whether the witness can continue to have her voice 
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heard, long after the media has switched off its tape-recorders and video 
cameras. In other words, her evidence has to be made to matter and the 
sacrifices inherent in coming forward to give it should be respected. It is 
not enough that it is intrinsically important in the courtroom; vic-
tim/witnesses like Chim Math must be protected beyond it if they are to 
feel comfortable in coming forward. 
The ICT-BD’s statutes provide only one crime of sexual violence, 
rape, as a core crime within the definition of crimes against humanity; and 
omit other offences, as well as a definition of ‘rape’.149 Additionally, in 
Bangladesh, the stigma associated with these crimes has led to the sup-
pression of evidence, and social problems associated with forced preg-
nancies.150 In such cases, where the testimonies provided by vulnerable 
victims/witnesses may be sensitive, especially where women are testify-
ing, the court needs to ensure adequate and sustained protection that goes 
beyond just physical protection. D’Costa and Hossain advocate gender-
sensitivity training for the tribunal staff, as well as caution and sensitivity 
when interviewing witnesses and victims, with which I wholly agree: 
If the Tribunal is to deal with sexual crimes, then an in-
formed review of the available evidence and an exploration 
of possible gender-friendly approaches is urgently needed.  
While the Tribunal does set up a possibility for some form of 
accountability, the investigation and trial process is a par-
ticularly thorny one in cases of sexual violence, and needs to 
be navigated with care and caution, given the risk of reper-
cussions for the survivors.
151
 
These observations are important and should be carefully heeded as 
the first judgement of the ICT-BD contains names of suspected sexual vi-
olence victims and makes little or no meaningful effort to provide them 
with adequate witness or victim support and protection.  
10.11. Conclusion 
The ICT-BD’s legacy will depend on its ability to contribute to building 
the capacity of Bangladesh’s justice sector, and the degree to which it 
harmonises the Bangladesh justice system with international rule of law 
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norms. This entails transferring knowledge, skills and practices from the 
ICT-BD to the rest of the national justice sector, and fostering local own-
ership of judicial and legal reform.  
As Diane Marie Aman has observed, while “conveying a concrete 
message of accountability may begin to break (the) cycle of violence, that 
message must be managed with the utmost care and respect for victims of 
mass violence”.152 If the ICT-BD trials are to have any resonance for 
Bangladeshi victims and to have a lasting and positive legacy in Bangla-
desh, its affiliates should pay close attention to the lessons which the 
ECCC offers and which I have distilled herein. I have couched these les-
sons in the form of genuine and concrete messages that should be sent to 
victims/witnesses when seeking to elicit credible evidence from them in 
relation to core crimes. Of course, these lessons are by no means exhaus-
tive, but they cast light on potential problems that need careful considera-
tion.  
 The ICT-BD should also give effect to Ambassador Rapp’s rec-
ommendations in this regard. First, its affiliates should do all they can to 
ensure that the witness protection system envisioned by Article 58(A) of 
the 2011 Act be developed in practice and made available for both prose-
cution and defence witnesses.  
Second, the ICT-BD’s proceedings must be accessible to all – ideal-
ly broadcast on television or radio, or possibly shared through reports by 
independent trial observers and victim associations that would show key 
testimony, arguments, and rulings and ensure that they are properly ex-
plained to victims and take into account their concerns and communal de-
sires for vindication and reparation. 
Third, the ICT-BD should make an effort to incorporate the rec-
ommendations made by Ambassador Rapp on ensuring the rights of the 
accused, taking inspiration from similar protections granted by the 
ICTR/ICTY.  
Without these guarantees, victims may feel that their role at the 
ICT-BD is a token one and may not be prepared to provide genuine and 
independent evidence, thereby significantly diminishing the legitimacy of 
the ICT-BD. Victim/witness protection, in particular, is critically im-
portant to eliciting and preserving the veracity of both ‘old’ and ‘new’ ev-
idence. Its central relevance to old evidence, however, is sometimes un-
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derestimated as the common misconception is that victims or witnesses of 
old evidence have come to terms with their past or are no longer under 
threat.  
As we have seen, real and perceived threats are often not dimin-
ished by the passage of time: they may remain unchanged or sometimes 
take on heightened dimensions due to changed political realities. In order 
to elicit credible evidence from victims/witnesses who have suffered so 
much, the law must send them the right message and, more importantly, it 
must have the modesty of ambition and live up to honour these messages, 
lest victims/witnesses lose what little confidence they may have in the 
process. 
The ICT-BD’s process should match available resources and politi-
cal will from local and international actors. Its mandate should be tailor-
made to suit operational realities. Consideration of the Cambodian experi-
ence shows that it is important not to create a flawed mechanism and then 
try to patch it up with quick fixes in response to criticisms levelled against 
it. Finally, prosecution is just one element in a toolbox of accountability. 
The Bangladesh government and the ICT-BD’s affiliates must closely ex-
amine their objectives to ensure that the mix of tools they select is best 
tailored to the particular need. Exaggerating what just one tool, prosecu-
tion, can reasonably accomplish may mean that other avenues that are 
more meaningful and effective are not explored or are foreclosed. 
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